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DATA PROTECTION CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Matthew R. Van Wasshnova*
INTRODUCTION
In the middle of 2006, two significant issues, both involving priva-
cy and specifically data protection, came to the forefront of U.S. efforts in
the War on Terror. First, in May 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
annulled an agreement between the United States and the European Union
regarding the transfer of airline passenger information--or passenger name
records (PNR)-from the European Union to the United States.' The an-
nulment of the PNR data transfer agreement by the ECJ reignited the debate
as to whether the transfers violated E.U. data protection laws. The second
major issue arose on June 24, 2006 when the New York Times uncovered a
secret U.S. government financial record surveillance program called the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).2 Details of the secret TFTP
immediately raised concerns of data protection violations both in the United
States and in the European Union.
Because terrorists reveal themselves to the international community
only (1) when they travel abroad; or (2) when they transact abroad, both the
PNR transfer and the TFTP represent noteworthy counter-terrorism efforts
by the United States. Clearly, however, the annulment of the PNR data
transfer agreement and disclosure of the TFTP to the international commu-
nity have strained relations between the European Union and the United
States. The European Union and the United States will be hard-pressed to
improve relations unless the two governments can find common ground
regarding the impact of their data protection policies on these two distinct
problems. In order to find that common ground, this note recommends (1)
that the United States terminate the TFTP and improve the existing system
* BA, University of Michigan (2003); JD, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law (2008). I would like to thank Professors Richard Gordon and Carol Fox for their helpful
thoughts and comments during the development of this Note. I would also like to thank my
wife, Stacy, for all her patience and support. This Note is current as of September 24, 2007.
Joined cases Case C-317/07 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the Eu-
ropean Union (C-317/04) and European Parliament v. Comm'n of the European Communi-
ties (C-318/04), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721 [hereinafter European Parliament].
2 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Date Sified in Secret by US. to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.
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of financial information exchange to obtain the information that it needs for
combating the financing of terrorism; and (2) that the United States apply
the existing system of financial information exchange to the PNR data trans-
fer process.
This Note seeks to adapt and apply the universally accepted system
of financial information exchange that was first developed as an anti-
money-laundering tool, and later embraced as a counter-terrorism finance
instrument, to the PNR data transfer and TFTP issues introduced above.
Therefore, it will address the transfer of airline passenger data alongside the
current global model of sharing financial information in anti-money laun-
dering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts. Part I
analyzes the general distinctions between data privacy protection policies in
the United States and European Union and examines the reasons underlying
the conflicts addressed in Part II. Part II first sets out the background of
PNR data transfers between the United States and European Union and the
evolution of the subsequent conflict regarding the transfers. Part II then
explores the TFTP and its alleged violations of E.U. data protection laws.
Part III considers the existing AML/CFT approach to financial information
exchange and its implementation in the United States and Europe. Remain-
ing mindful of the delicate balance between security and privacy protection,
Part IV recommends that (1) the United States and European Union follow
the existing system of financial information exchange in sharing airline pas-
senger information, and (2) the United States terminate the TFTP or restruc-
ture it so that it follows the AML/CFT model of sharing financial records.
I. E.U. AND U.S. DATA PROTECTION LAWS
A. The E. U. 's Blanket Protection vs. the U.S. 's "Patchwork Quilt"
The European Union and the United States have taken two separate,
and perhaps incompatible, paths in legislating data privacy.3 The European
Union aims to restrict the amount of data collected and to prevent the data
from being used for purposes other than those for which they were col-
lected.4 The United States, on the other hand, allows broader data collection
and storage. 5 Moreover, while the European Union has tightly woven a
blanket data protection policy "covering.the full spectrum of uses of perso-
nally identifiable information,"6 the United States has stitched a "patchwork
3 DOROTHY HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY 14 (2005).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Beth Givens, Privacy Expectations in a High Tech World, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348-49 (2000).
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quilt ' 7 of privacy legislation, legislating restrictions only where individual
problems arise.8 This basic difference between the data protection policies
of the United States and the European Union is the root problem underlying
the PNR data transfer and TFTP disputes outlined in Part II of this Note.
B. The European Union and the Data Protection Directive
In 1995, the European Parliament and the European Council passed
Directive9 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data
Protection Directive).' 0 The Data Protection Directive "can be seen as a
general framework legislative provision, which has as its principle aims: (1)
the protection of an individual's privacy in relation to the processing of per-
sonal data; and (2) the harmonization of the data protection of the Member
States.""
Another important principle of the Data Protective Directive is that
personal data can be transferred only to countries outside of the European
Union that guarantee an "adequate level of protection."' 2 Thus, the Data
Protection Directive has an extra-territorial effect because it prevents private
and public sector entities within the European Union from transferring data
to any countries outside of the European Union that provide inadequate data
protection. In determining whether a foreign country affords an adequate
level of protection, the Commission assesses the totality of the
circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation... [with] particular
consideration.., given to the nature of the data, the purpose and proposed
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and the country
7 Robert Gellman, Conflict and Overlap in Privacy Regulation: National, International
and Private, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 255, 257 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(1987).
8 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994); Family Education and
Privacy Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-22 (1994); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
9 A Directive is a piece of E.U. legislation that is addressed to Member States. PETER
CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 5 (2d ed. 2004). After
the legislation is passed at the EU level, the Member States must ensure that its directive is
applied in their own legal systems. Id.
10 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EC).
I I CAREY, supra note 9, at 6.
12 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 20 (EC) ("Where the Com-
mission finds... that a third country does not ensure an 'adequate' level of within the mean-
ing of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shall take the measures necessary to pre-
vent any transfer of data."); see also HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 31.
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of final destination, the rules of law ... and the professional rules and se-
curity measures which are complied with in that country.
13
When the European Commission (Commission) finds that a foreign country
does not maintain an adequate level of protection, Member States are re-
quired to prevent any data from being transferred to that country and the
Commission is required to enter into negotiations with the country to reme-
dy the problem.
14
A final major principle of the Data Protection Directive is its focus
on oversight. For instance, Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive re-
quires each Member State to establish an independent enforcement body. 5
Each Member State's independent authority must be consulted when the
government drafts legislation relating to processing of personal data.'
6
These independent authorities also have the power to conduct investiga-
tions, initiate legal proceedings, and hear claims pertaining to data protec-
tion violations. 17 In addition, Article 29 established the Article 29 Working
Party, which advises the Commission on data protection and privacy mat-
ters.18 The Article 29 Working Party is composed of a representative from
each Member State, a representative of the Community, and a representative
of the Commission.19
C. The Sectoral and Self-Regulatory Approach to Data Protection in
the United States
While the European Union has focused specifically on data protec-
tion in the Data Protection Directive, U.S. privacy law refers to a more gen-
eral right to privacy. 20 This is a direct result of the evolution of the U.S.
right to privacy at common law,2' which was necessitated by the failure of
13 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 20 (EC).
14 Id. art. 25.
'5 Id. art. 28(1).
16 Id. art. 28(2).
17 Id. art. 28(3)-(4).
18 Id. art. 29. Because the Data Protection Directive allows each Member State to imple-
ment the Data Protection Directive in different ways so long as all of the elements of the
Data Protection Directive are included in the Member State's national law, the actions of the
Article 29 Working Party constitute the primary EU-level involvement. HEISENBERG, supra
note 3, at 27.
19 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 29(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 23 (EC).
20 See HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 32(citation omitted); Julia M. Fromholz, The Euro-
pean Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 470 (2000).
21 See Barbara Crutchfield George et. al., US. Multinational Employers: Navigating
Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy Directive, 38
AM. Bus. L.J. 735, 746-50 (2001).
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the U.S. Bill of Rights to specifically provide for a fundamental right to
privacy.22 Because the term "privacy" can have various meanings in U.S.
law, ranging from a woman's right to an abortion to a person's choice to
keep or remove his or her name from a telemarketing list, a person has to
scour a number of authorities-the "patchwork quilt"-to determine how
any element of his or her data is protected in the United States. 23 This sec-
toral approach has at times left parts of the public inadequately protected
from privacy infringements and is specifically problematic because technol-
ogical developments render some legislation obsolete.24
The U.S. Congress has also applied protections unevenly between
the public and private sectors. As shown by the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)25 and the Privacy Act of 1974,26 the U.S. Congress has been willing
to regulate the use of data in the public sector.27 The Privacy Act of 1974,
which amended the FOIA, protects a person's records 28 from government
agency disclosure and requires that federal agencies establish "appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and
confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to their security or integrity. '29 Also under the Privacy Act of 1974,
agencies must "establish rules of conduct for persons involved in the design,
development, operation, or maintenance of any system of records .... "30
However, the fact that Congress deliberately chose not to extend the Privacy
Act of 1974 to the private sector illustrates the general reluctance of the
U.S. government to interfere in the affairs of individuals and businesses.31
22 Id. at 741. The U.S. Supreme Court has, however, found an implicit fundamental right
to privacy in certain circumstances. Id.
23 Fromholz, supra note 20, at 470.
24 HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 32-33.
25 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (2003). The FOIA permits any person,
regardless of nationality or country of residence, access to a U.S. federal agency's records,
unless one of the exemptions applies and protects the records in question from public disclo-
sure. See 5 U.S.C 552(a)-(b). Under the FOIA, an agency must withhold a record, where (1)
the information is confidential and commercial in nature, (2) "disclosure of [the information]
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," or (3) the information
is "compiled for law enforcement purposes ... to the extent that ... [disclosure may) reason-
ably be expected to constitute an unwanted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §§
552(b)(4), (6)-(7).
26 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 2000).
27 George, supra note 21, at 747, n.52.
28 Under the Privacy Act of 1974, a person's records means "any item, collection, or
grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but
not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or em-
ployment history." The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2000).
29 Id. § 552a(e)(10).
30 Id. § 552a(e)(9).
31 See George, supra note 21, at 746-48.
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Besides this "patchwork quilt" of data privacy legislation, the Unit-
ed States also relies on various forms of self-regulation, "in which compa-
nies and industry bodies establish codes of practice and engage in self-
policing., 32 Like the sectoral approach, however, self-regulation is often
criticized for being predominantly reactive, providing inadequate data pro-
tection, and failing to have sufficient independent oversight and enforce-
ment mechanisms.33
When the European Council passed the Data Protection Directive in
1995, the Commission considered U.S. protection of European data inade-
quate because the United States did not have comprehensive privacy protec-
tions.34 To enable the continuing free flow of commerce between the United
States and the European Union, the two governments approved the Safe
Harbor Principles-effective November 21, 2000. 35  In Decision
2000/520/EC, the Commission declares that the Safe Harbor Principles pro-
vide an adequate level of protection for the transfers of data from the Euro-
pean Union to the United States.36 While the Safe Harbor Principles enable
the free flow of information between the European Union and U.S. compa-
nies (i.e. commercial transactions), 37 they do not apply to transfers to gov-
ernment agencies.38 Thus, after the Safe Harbor Principles had served to
mend a portion of the U.S. "patchwork quilt" to the E.U. blanket Data Pro-
tection Directive, the stage was set for the two data privacy conflicts, which
both involved data transfers from the European Union to U.S. government
agencies.
II. THE TWO MAJOR TRANSATLANTIC DATA PRIVACY CONFLICTS IN 2006
A. PNR Transfers Between the United States and European Union
Some observers hailed [the ECJ airline passenger agreement annulment]
decision as a triumph of E. U. privacy law for protecting passenger infor-
mation and beating back the United States' post-September 11 efforts to
32 Privacy International, PHR 2005-Overview of Privacy (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.
privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-543673.
33 See, e.g., George, supra note 21, at 748.
34 HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 32.
35 Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed.
Reg. 45,666-01 (July 24, 2000); Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, Annex, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 10.
36 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, Annex, art. 1,
2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8 (EC).
37 See generally, Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and Inter-
national Relations, 35 VANo. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 678-84 (2002) (describing the devel-
opment, negotiation, and the nature of the Safe Harbor provisions).
38 See HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 141-42.
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extend its jurisdictional reach in the name of national security. Others,
however, have portrayed the ECJ as deciding the case on a technicality,
laying the groundwork for the Commission and the US. negotiators to
tweak the agreement only slightly-or the Commission simply to alter the
legal grounds for entering in the agreement-and for the data transfer to
continue as planned.
39
This section lays out the background of the passenger name record
transfers from the European Union to the United States and explains how
the latter observer's view in the quoted material above essentially has come
to fruition, allowing for a continuation of the status quo-a status quo that
many E.U. policymakers and privacy watchdogs feel provides the United
States with unbridled access to the statutorily protected private information
of European citizens.
1. Post-September 1 1th Legislation and the Creation of Conflict
On November 19, 2001, just two months after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, the United States enacted the Aviation and Transpor-
tation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA).40 ATSA requires all airline carriers
operating to, from, or across U.S. territory to provide the U.S Customs and
Border Protection Bureau (U.S. Customs) with electronic access to the PNR
data contained in their reservation and departure control systems.4' ATSA
also provides that the information transmitted to U.S. Customs "may be
shared with other Federal agencies for the purpose of protecting national
security. ' '42 Airlines that did not comply with ATSA could be subject to
fines or a revocation of landing rights.
2. European Reaction to ATSA and Subsequent Negotiations
As ATSA forced European commercial airlines to either violate the
Data Protection Directive or pay substantial penalties as a result,43 it created
the first concrete transatlantic conflict over data privacy.44 Although the
Data Protection Directive does not apply to the processing of personal data
in operations concerning public security, defense, and Member State securi-
39 Henriette Tielemans et al., The Transfer Of Airline Passenger Data to the US.: An
Analysis of the ECJ Decision, BNA INT'L WORLD DATA PROTECTION REP, June 2006, at 15.
40 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(codified as amended in scattered section of 49 U.S.C.).
41 49 U.S.C. 44909(c) (Supp. IV 2000).
42 id.
43 See HEISENBERG, supra note 3, 140-41.
44 See id. at 140.
2007-2008]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ty,45 the PNR were "collected for a commercial purpose (flying abroad), and
only subsequently exploited for national security information.... Hypothet-
ically, if the data had been collected only for security purposes, they likely
would have fallen under the security exemption that the national privacy
,,46laws have created for security and policing issues.
After more than a year of initial talks between the Commission and
U.S. officials and a postponement of the entry into force of the ATSA re-
quirements, senior officials of the Commission and U.S. Customs met in
Brussels in February 2003 to negotiate a solution to the conflict. 47 Although
the parties failed to reach an agreement that fully reconciled the provisions
of ATSA with the Data Protection Directive, they did issue a joint statement
(Joint Statement).48 The Joint Statement detailed the initial data protection
undertakings agreed to by U.S. Customs and confirmed the parties' inten-
tion to pursue talks with a view of allowing the Commission to make an
"adequacy finding" declaring U.S. data protection safeguards adequate in
accordance with Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive.49
Ten months later, on December 16, 2003, in a communication
(Communication) to the European Council and Parliament, the Commission
presented its approach for the transfer of PNR data to the United States.5°
The legal framework called for a "light" bilateral agreement between the
United States and the European Union and an "adequacy finding" by the
Commission.5 The Communication outlined a series of "undertakings" with
the United States, whereby the United States had agreed to: (1) limit its
PNR requests to a closed list of thirty-four items, (2) delete all categories of
sensitive data, (3) use the data only to prevent and combat terrorism and
related crimes, (4) retain the PNR data for no more than three and a half
years, (5) receive and handle representations from E.U. data protection au-
thorities on behalf of E.U. citizens who have outstanding complaints with
the Department of Homeland Security, and (6) participate with an E.U. team
45 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 12 (EC).
46 HEISENBERG, supra note 3, at 142.
47 Press Release, European Commission/U.S. Customs Talk on Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Transmission (July 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external-relations/us/intro/pnr.
htm.
48 Joint Statement, European Commission / US Customs talk on Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Transmission, (February 17-18, 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/conmi/external-relations/
us/intro/pnr-joint03_ 702.htm.
49 Id.
50 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, Transfer of
Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, COM (2003) 826 final
(Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Communication].
"I Id. at7.
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led by the Commission in an annual joint review.12 The Communication
detailed the characteristics of a "push" system of data transfers, which
means that the airlines would transmit the data to U.S. authorities, as op-
posed to the current "pull" system, which allows the United States access to
the airline reservation systems, and envisioned "switching to 'push' with
filters by the middle of 2004."53 Finally, the Communication advocated that
a multilateral approach to the PNR data transfer problem be developed and
recommended that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)54
was "the most appropriate framework" for bringing forth a multilateral in-
itiative. 5
3. Bilateral PNR Data Transfer Agreement
On May 14, 2004, the Commission, under Article 25(2) of the Data
Protection Directive and in line with the Joint Statement and the Communi-
cation, found that U.S. Customs ensured an adequate level of protection for
PNR data transferred from the European Union.56 Subsequently, on May 17,
2004, the E.U. Council approved the conclusion of the PNR data processing
and transfer agreement, 57 and on May 28, 2004, the United States and the
European Union signed a definite agreement on the processing and transfer
of the PNR data (Original Agreement).58 For the most part, the Original
Agreement contained the provisions set forth above in the Communication,
except that it contained no mention of a multilateral approach under the
ICAO nor did it mention an expiration date for the current "pull" system of
PNR data transfers.59
52 Id. at 5-8.
51 Id. at 5-8.
54 The ICAO is a U.N. specialized agency, which "works to achieve its vision of safe,
secure and sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation amongst its mem-
ber States." Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Strategic Objectives of ICAOfor 2005-2010,
§1.1 app., U.N. Doe CAR/WG/1 - IP/06 (May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.icao.int/nacc/meetings/2007/carwg0l/CARWGOlipO6.pdf. The ICAO was estab-
lished on December 7, 1944 under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention). Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 43, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
1192, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 324. The ICAO has 189 contracting states. ICAO, Contracting
States, http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto-m.pl?cgi/statesDB4.pl?en.
55 Communication, supra note 50, at 9.
56 Commission Decision on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Contained in the
Passenger Name Record of Air Passengers Transferred to the United States' Bureau of Cus-
toms and Border Protection 2004/535/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11, 13 (EC).
57 Council Decision 2004/496/EC, art. 1, 2004 0.1. (L 183) 83, 83 EC).
58 Id.; Press Release, European Commission, International Agreement on Passenger Name
Records (PNR) Enters into Force, (May 28, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
extemalrelations/us/news/ip04_694.htm.
59 Council Decision 2004/496/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83 (EC).
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4. ECJ Annulment of the PNR Agreement
On July 27, 2004, the European Parliament applied to the ECJ for
annulment of the May 17, 2004 Council decision and of the Commission's
decision on the adequacy of United States' data protection, contending "that
adoption of the decision on adequacy was ultra vires, that Article 95 EC
does not constitute an appropriate legal basis for the decision approving the
conclusion of the agreement and, in both cases, that fundamental rights have
been infringed."60 On May 30, 2006, the ECJ joined the actions against the
Council (C-317/04) and the Commission (C-318/04) and without addressing
the ultra vires or fundamental rights infringement claims, annulled both the
Council decision and the Commission's decision on adequacy and gave the
parties until September 30, 2006 to work out a new agreement.
61
In the case against the Commission, the ECJ reasoned that even
though the PNR data may be viewed as being collected first by the airlines
for commercial purposes (the sale of an airplane ticket for a supply of ser-
vices), the Commission's decision on adequacy concerns data processing
regarded as necessary for safeguarding public security and for law-
enforcement purposes. 62 Since Article 3(2)63 of the Data Protection Direc-
tive excludes data processing for operations concerning public security,
defense, and Member State security from the scope of the Data Protection
Directive, the ECJ held that the Commission's decision on adequacy does
not fall within the scope of Data Protection Directive and it must therefore
be annulled.64
In the case against the E.U. Council, the Parliament argued that Ar-
ticle 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union does not constitute
an appropriate legal basis ,or the Council's decision. 65 Article 95(1) pro-
vides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[t]he Council shall ... adopt the meas-
60 Press Release, European Court of Justice, The Court Annuls the Council Decision Con-
cerning the Conclusion of an Agreement Between the European Community and the United
States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Personal Data and the Commission
Decision on the Adequate Protection of Those Data, (May 30, 2006) (citation omitted),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp06/aff/cpO60046en.pdf.
61 Joined cases Case C-317/07 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the Eu-
ropean Union (C-317/04) and European Parliament v. Comm'n of the European Communi-
ties (C-318/04), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721.
62 Id. at paras. 56-57.
63 "This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: in the course of an
activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles
V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concern-
ing public security, defence [and] State security .... Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 3(2),
1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 12 (EC).
64 European Parliament 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, paras. 58-59.
65 European Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, para. 63.
[Vol. 39:827
DATA PROTECTION CONFLICTS
ures for approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the estab-
lishment and functioning of the internal market." 66 The Parliament further
argued that Article 95 "cannot justify [c]ommunity competence to conclude
the [Original] Agreement" because the Original Agreement relates to data
processing operations which "are excluded from the scope of the [Data Pro-
tection] Directive. 67 Although Article 25 of the Data Directive allows per-
sonal data to be transferred to a third country provided that the country en-
sures an adequate level of protection, the ECJ held Article 95 EC, even read
"in conjunction with Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, cannot
justify Community competence to conclude the Agreement" because as
determined in Decision C-318, the PNR data transfer to the United States is
outside the scope of the Data Protection Directive.68 Thus, the E.U. Council
did not have an appropriate legal basis for its decision.
69
5. The Interim and Revised PNR Transfer Agreements
As directed by the ECJ in the annulment decisions, the European
Union and United States negotiators reached an interim agreement on Octo-
ber 16, 2006 (Interim Agreement), which subsequently expired on July 31,
2007.70 Before the Interim Agreement expired, the European Union and
United States negotiators finalized a revised agreement (Revised Agree-
ment), signed on July 23, 2007 in Brussels, and July 26, 2007 in Washing-
ton, D.C. 71 The Revised Agreement consists of three elements: (1) "an
agreement signed by both parties"; (2) "[a] letter by [the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security] giving assurances on the way it intends to protect PNR
data"; and (3) "[a] reply letter from the [European Union] . . . confirming
that on the basis of the assurances, it considers the level of protection of
66 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 95, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340)
3, 213 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
67 European Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721 para. 67-68.
68 Id. at paras. 63-67.
69 See id. at para. 69.
70 Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the Unit-
ed States Department of Homeland Security, U.S.-E.U., Oct. 27, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 298) 29,
29-31 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]; see also Press Release, European Commission, EU
and US Reach Agreement on the Continued Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data
(October 6, 2006), http://www.eurunion.orgNews/press/2006/20060086.htm. The Council
adopted the Interim Agreement on October 16, 2006. Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA
2006 O.J. (L 298) 27(EU).
71 Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the Unit-
ed States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), U.S.-E.U., July
23, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 18, 18-20 [hereinafter Revised Agreement].
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PNR data in the United States as adequate. 72 It expires seven years after the
"date of signature," unless the parties mutually agree to replace it or if one
of the parties terminates the agreement, at any time, through diplomatic
channels.73
In order to abide by the annulment decisions, the Council-first in
the Interim Agreement and then in the Revised Agreement--changed the
legal basis of the E.U.-U.S. PNR agreement from the Treaty Establishing
the European Community74 or "first pillar" to the Treaty on European Un-
ion 75 or "third pillar., 76 As a result, the Revised Agreement now falls under
the competence of the European Union, as opposed to the European Com-
munity.
77
To the dismay of the European Parliament and the Article 29 Work-
ing Party, the Revised Agreement did not go as far as expected in safe-
guarding airline passenger privacy.78 On the one hand, the Revised Agree-
ment does incorporate some important safeguards that were lacking in the
previous two agreements. For instance, the Revised Agreement extends the
privacy protections found in the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of
Information Act to non-U.S. citizens and provides a system of redress for
persons seeking information about or correction of PNR.79 In addition, the
Revised Agreement provides assurances from the Department of Homeland
Security that it "will provide to airlines a form of notice concerning PNR
collection and redress practices to be available for public display [and]...
will work with interested parties in the aviation industry to promote greater
visibility of this notice. ' 80 Finally, the Revised Agreement adopts the
"push" system of transmitting PNR.8'
72 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-Up Agreement
Between the European Union and the United States ofAmerica on the Processing and Trans-
fer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department
of Homeland Security Concluded in July 2007, at 5, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp 138_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter
Opinion 5/2007].
73 Revised Agreement, supra note 71, at 19.
74 See Interim Agreement, supra note 70; Revised Agreement, supra note 71; E.C. Treaty,
supra note 66.
75 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2002 O.J. (C325) 5.
76 See Interim Agreement, supra note 70, at 30; EuR. PARL. Doc. (B6-0393) 4 (2006) at
para. 11.
77 See Revised Agreement, supra note 71, at 18.
78 See, e.g., EUR. PARE. DoC. (B-6-0393) (2006) (addressing issues in the draft version of
the Revised Agreement that were included in the final version of the Revised Agreement);
Opinion 5/2007 supra note 72, at 2-4.
79 Revised Agreement, supra note 71, at 23.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 23-24.
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On the other hand, the Revised Agreement weakens many of the sa-
feguards provided for under the previous two agreements. First, the Revised
Agreements extends the retention period from three and one-half years to
fifteen years, with the possibility of it being extended further.82 Second, the
Department of Homeland Security now may use sensitive PNR data ele-
ments-"personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and data con-
cerning health or sex life of the individual"-in exceptional cases, "where
the life of a data subject or of others could be imperiled or seriously im-
paired. 83 Third, while the Revised Agreement seems to reduce the number
of PNR elements transferred to U.S. authorities from thirty-four to nine-
teen,84 this change is a mere subterfuge as the Revised Agreement groups all
but one of the thirty-four elements into one of nineteen new data sets.85
Fourth, and finally, the Revised Agreement requires the airlines to transfer
new PNR data that were not required under the previous agreements, in-
cluding additional baggage and frequent flyer information.86
Because the Revised Agreement does not adequately provide priva-
cy protections, Part IV of this Note recommends a solution for the PNR
transfer issue which respects the principles of the Data Protection Directive
without sacrificing the effective elements of PNR transfer as a counter-
terrorism tool.
B. The Terrorist Financing Tracking Program
1. The New York Times' Disclosure of the Secret Government Pro-
gram
The other major development of 2006 in the E.U-U.S. conflict over
data protection occurred on June 23, 2006 when the New York Times pub-
lished details of the U.S. government's Terrorist Finance Tracking Pro-
gram.87 TFTP, which is run by the CIA and overseen by the Treasury De-
partment, relies on Executive powers under the International Emergency
82 Under the Revised Agreement, data is stored in an active analytical database for seven
years and then moved to dormant, non-operational status for eight years, where it can be
"accessed only with approval of a senior [Department of Homeland Security] official .. . and
only in response to an identifiable case, threat, or risk. Id. at 23. After the fifteen year period
has expired, the Department of Homeland Security expects that the data will be deleted, and
the Revised Agreement states that "questions of whether and when to destroy PNR data ...
will be addressed ... as part of future discussions." Id.
83 Id.
84 See id.; Opinion 5/2007, supra note 72, at 9.
85 Id.
86 Revised Agreement, supra note 71, at 21-22.
87 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2.
2007-2008]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Economic Powers Act of 197888 (IEEPA) to acquire information about fi-
nancial transactions from the world's largest financial communication net-
work-the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT). 89 Since just after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. gov-
ernment has been secretly requesting financial data from SWIFT in an effort
to track terrorist financing activities.90 Once the U.S. Department of Trea-
sury receives the information from SWIFT, it compiles the data in a massive
database, which is searchable by the CIA, FBI, and other government agen-
cies.91
a. SWIFT: The "Plumbing" Between Financial Institutions
92
SWIFT is a Belgian company owned and operated by a consortium
of financial institutions.93 It supplies secure messaging services in more than
200 countries and to more than 8,100 financial institutions (banks, brokers,
investment managers, and market infrastructures).94 Generally, the secure
messages that are transmitted by SWIFT contain only limited amounts of
personal data such as the name of the beneficiary or the ordering customer
and a reference number, which "allows the payer and payee to reconcile the
payment with their respective accounting documents. 95
88 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000).
89 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 At the European Parliament Hearing held on October 4, 2006, Francis Vanbever, Chief
Financial Officer of Swift described SWIFT "as the 'plumbing' between financial institu-
tions." Press Release, SWIFT, SWIFT Re-Iterates Calls for EU-US Dialogue on Security and
Data Privacy (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cftn?item-id=60670.
9' See SWIFT, About SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfin?itemid=43232 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007).
94 Leonard H. Schrank, Yawar Shah, & Stephen Zimmerman, SWIFT Statement on Com-
pliance Policy, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=59897 (last visited Nov.
16, 2007).
95 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing of Per-
sonal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT),
01935/06/EN, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/
wpl28_en.pdf [hereinafter Opinion 10/2006]. These user disclosure requirements relate to
Special Recommendation VII of the Financial Action Task Force's Nine Special Recom-
mendations on Terrorist Financing. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1. Special Recommenda-
tion VII on wire transfers suggests, in pertinent part, that: "[c]ountries should take measures
to require financial institutions ... to include accurate and meaningful originator information
(name, address and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent,
and the information should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment
chain." Id.
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SWIFT maintains two operations centers-one in the United States
and the other in Belgium. 96 All messages processed by SWIFT are stored
for 124 days in both of the two operation centers.97 The dual storage or
"mirroring" acts as a back-up recovery tool for customers in case of dis-
putes between financial institutions or data loss.
98
Since SWIFT is neither a bank nor a payment or settlement system,
it is not regulated by central banks or bank supervisors.99 Nevertheless, the
central banks of the Group of Ten countries have set up a system of cooper-
ative oversight of SWIFT.' 00 Although the European Central Bank knew of
TFTP, it did not notify European data protection authorities.' 0' Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, said that the European
Central Bank "has no authority to supervise [SWIFT] with regard to com-
pliance with data protection laws."10 2 Peter Praet, President of the National
Bank of Belgium, which leads the SWIFT oversight group, echoed Trichet's
sentiments and added that the transfers posed no threat to financial stabili-
ty.103 The Bank of England claims that it informed the U.K. Treasury De-
partment, and although the U.K. Treasury Department may have shared the
information internally, it did not disclose SWIFT's activities to the Article
29 Working Party or the Commission.10 4
b. The Process of Obtaining Data from SWIFT
To obtain the data that it wanted from SWIFT, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the U.S. Department of Treasury sent administrative sub-
poenas °5 to SWIFT. 1 6 In responding to the U.S. Department of Treasury
96 Opinion 10/2006, supra note 95, at 8.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 SWIFT, Oversight of SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=57001 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007).
1oo Id.
101 See Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank Group and Overseer for US. Access to Data,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 2006. The European Data Protection Supervisory ("EDPS") heavily
criticized the European Central Bank for not notifying the proper authorities. Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Alexi Mostrous & Ian Cobain, CIA's Secret Bank Trawl May Be Illegal: US Effort to
Track Jihadist Money Transfers Faces Inquiry Over Privacy, GUARDIAN, Aug. 21, 2006,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,, 1854813,00.html.
105 An administrative subpoena is an official order from a government agency compelling a
third party to produce certain information. See, e.g,. United States. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
498 F.Supp. 1027, 1028-1030 (E.D.Wis. 1980). Generally, for an administrative subpoena to
be valid, the inquiry must be within the authority of the agency, the demand must not be too
indefinite, and the information sought must be reasonably relevant to the inquiry. Id. at 29
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subpoenas, SWIFT activated its "compliance policy," adopted by its Board
of Directors in the early 1990s. 10 7 SWIFT's policy, which is included in its
customer contracts and published on its website, states that while SWIFT
takes all necessary measures to ensure the highest degree of integrity and
confidentiality for the data messaging service that it provides, it has to
comply with legal subpoenas and warrants issued by authorities.0 8 SWIFT,
in accordance with this policy, then sent the requested information to the
U.S. Department of Treasury. 09 According to Under Secretary for the Of-
fice of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart Levey, before a search
can be run, analysts must first explain how the target of the search is con-
nected to a counter-terrorism investigation." 0 Levey claims that the pro-
gram is legal and that the authority to ascertain the records from SWIFT and
review them comes from the IEEPA. 11 Levey stated that with respect to
oversight, SWIFT's auditors are able to monitor the searches and that a
record of each search is kept. Booz Allen Hamilton (Booz Allen), an outside
independent auditor, then reviews the record. 1
2
c. The Aftermath of the Disclosure
As soon as the New York Times initially released the details of
TFTP,' '3 foreign officials from across the globe, but especially in the Euro-
pean Union, raised concerns as to whether the program violated their coun-
tries' privacy laws. 114 In fact, on July 7, 2006 the European Parliament
(citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, (1950)). An administrative agency
obtains subpoena power by statute. Id. at 28.
106 Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, U.S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data, L.A. TIMES, June
23, 2006, at 1A.
107 Press Release, SWIFT, SWIFT Statement on Compliance Policy (June 23, 2006),
http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=59897.
108 Id.
109 Meyer & Miller, supra note 106.
110 Id.
i11 Id.
112 Id.
13 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2. It is interesting to note that on October 22, 2006, the
public editor of the New York Times, Byron Calame, admitted that his earlier defense of the
newspaper's decision to publish details on the TFTP was a mistake. Byron Calame, Banking
Data: A Mea Culpa, N.Y. TIMEs, October 22, 2006. Calame cited two factors in reversing his
position: (1) he had not found any evidence that the program was illegal under United States
laws, and (2) no abuses of private data had been uncovered. Id. Calame's "original support
for the article rested heavily on the fact that so many people already knew about the program
that serious terrorists also must have been aware of it," but as Calame points out if the pro-
gram was not secret, why did the New York Times portray it as such. Id.
14 See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky & Eric Lichtblau, Swiss Official Says Bank Broke Law by Sup-
plying Data to US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at A7; Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank
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adopted a resolution which expressed "its serious concern at the fact that a
climate of deteriorating respect for privacy and data protection is being
created" and urged the United States "and its intelligence and security ser-
vices to act in a spirit of good cooperation and notify their allies of any se-
curity operations they intend to carry out on E.U. territory."'"15 The resolu-
tion focused its concern on the European citizens and their parliamentary
representation lacking adequate notice of the program, but also raised the
possibility of the transfers of "information on the economic activities of the
individuals and countries concerned" being linked to "large-scale forms of
economic and industrial espionage."
'1 16
Surprisingly, despite the concerns that the program violates E.U.
data protection laws, the Article 29 Working Party,' 17 an independent E.U.
advisory body on data protection and privacy, waited until November 22,
2006 to issue an opinion--Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal
data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(Opinion 10/2006)--denouncing SWIFT's activities with respect to the
TFTP participation.' 18 In Opinion 10/2006, the Article 29 Working Party
concludes that SWIFT violated the Directive and calls for it to cease all
infringements." 9 Opinion 10/2006's first and most important finding is that
SWIFT represents a data controller under Article 2 of the Data Protection
Directive. 20 SWIFT, on the other hand, contends that it served only as a
data processor under the Act.121 Under the Data Protection Directive, a
"controller" means "the natural or legal persona, public authority, agency or
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes
Group and Overseer for US. Access to Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. Because
SWIFT is based in Belgium, it is subject to Belgian data protection law and thus the Data
Protection Directive. Opinion 10/2006, supra note 95, at 2.
115 EuR. PARL. Doc. (B6-0393) 4 (2006).
116 EUR. PARE. Doc. (B6-0386) 2 (2006).
117 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
118 Opinion 10/2006, supra note 95. In fact, the Article 29 Working Party did not hold its
first plenary discussion regarding the SWIFT transfers to the United States until September
26, 2006. Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, Press Release on the SWIFT Case (Sept.
26, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/news/docs/PRSwiftAffair26 09
06_en.pdf.
119 Id. Switzerland, which is not a member of the European Union, has also stated that
"Swiss banks broke their nation's laws by providing banking information to American coun-
terterrorism officials." Dan Bilefsky & Eric Lichtblau, Swiss Official Says Banks Broke Law
by Supplying Data to US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at A7.
120 Opinion 10/2006, supra note 95, at 9.
121 SWIFT, SWIFT Supports Calls for Debate to Move Beyond Data Privacy to Security
and Public Safety (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfln?itemid=60784 [herei-
nafter SWIFT Response] (containing SWIFT's response to the Belgian Privacy Commision's
Advisory Opinion of September 27, 2006).
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and means of the processing of personal data," while a "processor" means
"a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.' 22 The distinction is
important because as the definitions indicate, a data processor processes
information on behalf of the controller; therefore, the processor's duties
under the Data Protection Directive are limited as compared to those of the
data controller. 23 The Article 29 Working Party, however, held that SWIFT
acts as a controller in both its normal secure messaging services and its
processing of the subpoenaed data, and thus is responsible for complying
with the Data Protection Directive, as a controller, even before the informa-
tion was sent to the U.S. authorities. 124 As such, the Article 29 Working
Party called for SWIFT to cease its Data Protective Directive infringements
and return to lawful data processing immediately.
125
d. SWIFT Joins the Safe Harbor
After issuing Opinion 10/2006, the Article 29 Working Party-at its
Fifty-Ninth, 2 6 Sixtieth, 127 and Sixty-First 28 Meetings held on February 14-
15, April 17-18, and June 19-20, 2007, respectively-reported on SWIFT's
progress in complying with the Data Protection Directive. It appears that
after the Article 29 Working Party had called for SWIFT to cease its efforts
in the TFTP, it shifted its focus to aiding SWIFT in complying with the Da-
ta Protective Directive and ensuring that the financial institutions alert their
clients that U.S. authorities may have access to the client's personal data.
After nearly a year of limited response on the TFTP, on June 28,
2007, Stuart Levey sent a letter to the European Commission transmitting "a
[unilateral] set of representations which describe the controls and safeguards
122 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(d)-(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 11-12 (EC).
123 A data processor still must comply with the provisions of the Data Protection Directive.
See, e.g., id. art. 16 ("Any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the pro-
cessor, including the processor himself, who has access to personal data must not process
them except on instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law.").
124 See SWIFT Response, supra note 121, at 2.
125 Opinion 10/2006, supra note 95, at 28.
126 See Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, The Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party Met Representatives of SWIFT (Feb. 16, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp29_pr 6 02 07 en.pdf.
127 Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
Considered Again the SWIFT Case, (Apr. 20, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/
privacy/news/docs/pr 20 04 07_en.pdf.
128 Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
Continued its Deliberations on the SWIFT Case (June 21, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_
home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr21 06 07 en.pdf.
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governing the handling, use and dissemination of data under the [TFTP].' 29
The representations (Representations) were sent in preparation for SWIFT's
possible entry into the Safe Harbor. As mentioned in Part II, the Safe Har-
bor Principles do not apply to data transfers to government authorities.'
30
Unlike the PNR transfers by the E.U. airlines to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, however, the SWIFT processing center in Europe trans-
fers the data to its U.S. branch for commercial purposes-mirroring the data
to ensure its integrity-and any access by U.S. authorities takes place sub-
sequently, in the United States. Nonetheless, since the data is subsequently
accessed by U.S. authorities, U.S. efforts under the TFTP invoke the Safe
Harbor Principles,' 31 and the Representations provide an assurance that the
United States will process the SWIFT data in compliance with E.U. data
protection principles.1
32
The Representations first provide a background of the TFTP-the
fundamental principles underlying the program, the concerns raised within
the European Union, and even its adherence to international counterterrorist
financing principles.133 Then, in defense of the TFTP, the Representations
provide the United States legal authority for obtaining and using the SWIFT
data.134 The Representations also describe the limited scope of the TFTP-
including restrictions on extraction from SWIFT and the sharing of data
among U.S. agencies, the "multiple complementary layers of independent
oversight," and the system of redress available to those harmed by U.S. go-
vernmental authorities.' 35 Finally, and most importantly, the Representa-
tions declare that "an eminent European person will be appointed to confirm
that the [TFTP] is implemented consistent with the[] Representations for the
purpose of verifying the protection of EU-originating personal data.' 36 In
129 Letter from Stuart A. Levey, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury Under Secretary for the Office
of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, to Peer Steinbrfick and Vice-President Frattini,
German Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the European Comm'n (June 28, 2007),
2007 O.J. (C 166/08) 17.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
131 The Safe Harbor Principles allow limitations "to the extent necessary to meet national
security, public interest or law enforcement [purposes]." Commission Decision
2000/520/EC, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, Annex, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 10 (EC).
132 See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Processing and Protection of Per-
sonal Data Subpoenaed by the Treasury Department From the U.S. Based Operation Centre
of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) (June 28,
2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/en/misc/95017.pdf.
133 Processing of EU Originating Personal Data by the United States Treasury Department
for Counter Terrorism Purposes-'SWIFT,' 2007 O.J. (C 166/09) 18 [hereinafter Represen-
tations].
131 Id. at 20.
13 Id. at 21-23.
136 Id. at 25.
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particular, the eminent person, who will be appointed by the Commission
for a two year renewable term, will ensure that non-extracted data has been
deleted.137 In carrying out his or her duties, the eminent person will be com-
pletely independent and will report his or her findings annually to the
Commission.'
38
In a reply letter, representatives of the Commission and the Council,
took note of Levey's letter, welcomed the unilateral representations, and
declared that once SWIFT provided the financial data to the United States
for commercial purposes in accordance with the Safe Harbor Principles, it
(and the financial institutions making use of its services) would be "in com-
pliance with [its] respective legal responsibilities under European data pro-
tection law."'
139
Accordingly, on July 16, 2007, the U.S. branch of SWIFT joined
the Safe Harbor, thereby agreeing to handle the personal data that it receives
from the European Union in accordance with the Safe Harbor Principles.
1 40
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXCHANGE
Part III provides a background of the existing system of financial
information exchange. An understanding of this system is critical in concep-
tualizing the positions that are advocated in Part IV.
A. The International Anti-Money-Laundering Legal Framework
Formalized international exchange of financial information began
as an anti-money-laundering effort but has since evolved into an effective
counter-terrorism tool. The international exchange of financial transactions
came as a natural result of progressive international efforts in the late
1980's and early 1990's to develop an "international law enforcement re-
gime" 141 to combat the ills of money-laundering. That is, given the transna-
tional characteristics of money-laundering transactions, law enforcement
137 id.
138 Id.
139 Franco Frattini & Peer Steinbruck, Reply from the European Union to the United States
Treasury Department-SWIFT/Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, 2007 O.J. (C
166/10) 26.
140 SWIFT, SWIFT Safe Harbor Policy (July 16, 2007), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?
item id=62653.
141 "An international law enforcement regime can be defined as: 'a global arrangement
among governments to co-operate against particular transnational crimes."' GuY STESSENS,
MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL 17 (2000) (quot-
ing E. NADELMANN, CoPs ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT 22 (1993)).
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agencies from around the globe needed an effective means of sharing finan-
cial information in order to effectively counter money-laundering activities.
The first major international anti-money-laundering effort 142 came
in 1984 when the United Nations (UN) began working on a convention to
combat the growing international drug-trafficking problem., 43 In 1988, the
UN enacted the Convention Against Illicit Drug Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (Convention). 144 Although the Convention
does not expressly use the phrase "money-laundering,"'' 45 the drafters of the
Convention recognized that in order to effectively combat the widespread
distribution and sale of illicit drugs, law enforcement authorities should go
after those who "direct, finance, manage and profit from the criminal net-
works .... , In fact, one commentator has noted that the Convention's
central purpose was to "provide the law enforcement community with the
necessary tools to undermine the financial power of the cartels ....
Anti-money-laundering efforts have also been deeply influenced by
a number of "soft" law instruments, which lack justiciability 148 but not nec-
essarily content.t 49 The "crown jewel of soft law"150 anti-money-laundering
instruments is the forty recommendations for fighting money-laundering
142 The first international instrument to specifically address the issue of money laundering
was the Basel Statement of Principles passed on December 12, 1988. Although not a truly
international effort, the Basel Statement of Principles "played a pioneer role ... [in provid-
ing] a framework of rules in an area of law where formal legislation was still lacking."
STESSENS, supra note 141, at 16-17.
143 See John Evans, International Efforts to Contain Money Laundering, INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 3 (Apr. 8, 1997), availa-
ble at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/MoneyLaundering.pdf.
144 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.
20, 1988, 32 U.S.T 543, 26 U.N.T.S. 164.
145 The Convention expresses the wrongdoing as follows: "[t]he conversion or transfer of
property, knowing that such property is derived from any offence or offences established in
accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such
offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the prop-
erty or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or of-
fences to evade the legal consequences of his actions." Id. at art. 3(b)(i).
146 Evans, supra note 143, at 3.
147 WILLIAM GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-
MEASURES 64 (1995).
148 Justiciabilty means "[t]he quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudica-
tion by a court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529, 278-79 (2d ed. 1984) ("Concepts of justi-
ciability have been developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action.... The
central concepts often are elaborated into more specific categories of justiciability-advisory
opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and
administrative questions.")
149 See STESSENS, supra note 141, at 15.
IS0 Id.
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and promoting good financial governance (Forty Recommendations) issued
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1990.1'1 The G-7152 heads of
state created the FATF at the 1989 G-7 summit in Paris in recognition of the
danger that money-laundering posed to the banking and financial systems of
the developed world.' 53 The FATF is an inter-governmental body, which
currently has thirty-four members-thirty-two countries and governments
and two international organizations. 54 The mandate of the FATF at its in-
ception was
to assess the results of co-operation already undertaken in order to prevent
the utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for purpose
[sic] of money laundering, and to consider additional preventative efforts
in this field, including the adaptation of the legal and regulatory systems so
as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance. 155
The Forty (non-binding) Recommendations "provide a complete set
of counter-measures against money-laundering covering the criminal justice
system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and
international co-operation."1 56 Many governments and international bodies
have, in whole or in part, recognized, endorsed, or adopted the Forty Rec-
ommendations as a means of combating money-laundering.' 57 In fact, the
European Council incorporated fifteen of the Forty Recommendations into
the Directive on Prevention and Use of the Financial System for the Purpose
of Money-Laundering.
158
B. International Financial Information Sharing
Beginning in the early 1990's, the first few financial intelligence
units were established "in response to the need for a central agency within
each nation to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial information to
151 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), FATF Documents on Forty Recommendations of,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow "40 Recs" hyperlink) (last visited oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Forty Recommendations].
152 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States
compose the G-7 countries. See http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p =
washfile-english&y=2007&m=October&x=20071017175020saikceinawz0.9418756.
153 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ (fol-
low "About the FATF" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
154 Id.
155 Evans, supra note 143, at 5-6 (citation omitted).
156 Forty Recommendations, supra note 151.
157 Id.
158 See Council Directive 2005/60/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15, 20-32 (EC); Alan E. Sorcher,
Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying With Money-
Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 408-12 (2005).
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combat money-laundering."' 159 A financial intelligence unit (FLU) is "a cen-
tral, national agency responsible for receiving, (and as permitted, request-
ing), analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures
of financial information: (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and
potential financing of terrorism, or (ii) required by national legislation or
regulation, in order to combat money-laundering or terrorism financing."'
160
In June of 1995, a group consisting of government agencies and in-
ternational organizations met at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels to
discuss money-laundering and ways to confront this global problem. 61 As a
result of this meeting and in recognition of the benefits inherent in the de-
velopment of an FLU network, the Egmont Group, an informal organization
of financial intelligence units, was formed.162 Now, the Egmont Group con-
sists of one hundred FIUs from around the globe.
163
Because money-laundering is often a transnational activity, one of
the principle priorities of the Egmont Group is the stimulation of informa-
tion exchange among its members.' 64 Similarly, although not specifically
referencing FIUs, FATF Recommendation 40 states, in relevant part, that:
[c]ountries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the wid-
est possible range of international cooperation to their foreign counterparts
.... Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign compe-
tent authority is not within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are al-
so encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of informa-
tion with non-counterparts.
FIU-to-FIU information sharing allows "FIUs, domestic law enforcement
agencies, and other domestic 'consumers' of financial intelligence . . . to
seek and obtain information promptly from foreign governments in order to
deter, detect, and prosecute money-laundering, terrorist financing, and re-
159 THE WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (Paul Gleason & Glenn Gottselig eds., 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf [hereinafter FlU OVERVIEW].
160 THE EGMONT GROUP, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE CONCERNING THE EGMONT DEFINITION OF A
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT 2 (2004), http://www.egmontgroup.org/egmont-fmal_
interpretive.pdf.
161 Id. at 1; THE EGMONT GROUP INFORMATION PAPER ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITSAND THE EGMONT GROUP (2004), http://www.egmontgroup.org/infojpaperfinal oct 2004
.pdf.
162 Id.
t63 See THE EDGMONT GROUP FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE WORLD (2007),
http://www.egmontgroup.org/list-of fius.pdf.
164 See THE EGMONT GROUP, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE OF THE EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL
INTELLIGENCE UNITS 1-2 (2004), http://www.egmontgroup.org/statementof purpose.pdf
[hereinafter EGMONT GROUP STATEMENT OF PURPOSE].
165 Forty Recommendations, supra note 151, Recommendation 40.
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lated crimes."1 66 The information transfers are a result of a strong system of
reciprocity.
67
A country's own law determines the ability of its FIU to share in-
formation with other FIUs and agencies in foreign governments. 68 Some
countries authorize their FIUs to exchange information with other FIUs
without a formal agreement, while others require the existence of a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU), 169 setting forth the terms and conditions
that govern the transfer. 170 Although an MOU is not judicially enforceable,
it carries with it not only "a moral obligation to live up to the terms of the
arrangement" but also a fear that any breach will damage the reciprocal
lines of information exchange.
171
The general model of information exchange between FIUs is rather
simple. The requesting FIU 172 typically sends a request in writing--either
on paper or electronically173-to another FIU. 174 Generally, the requests
contain the type of information sought and the intended use of the informa-
tion. 175 The Egmont Group recommends that the "[r]equests . . . contain
sufficient background information to enable the requested FIU to conduct
proper analysis/investigation" and "be accompanied by a brief statement of
the relevant facts known to the requesting FIU.' 76 The receiving FIU
should then process the request and send the information to the requesting
FIU as soon as possible. 177 If the transmitting FIU consents, 178 the receiving
FlU may disseminate the information to law enforcement officials.
79
166 FlU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 65.
167 See THE EGMONT GROUP, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS 2 (2004), http://www.egmontgroup.org/
bestpractices.pdf [hereinafter FU BEST PRACTICES].
168 FU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 66.
169 See id. Rather than entering into a MOU, some FUs prefer to enter into an exchange of
letters, which can be substantively the same as an MOU. Id.
170 The Egmont Group has developed a model MOU for FIu-to-FlU information sharing.
See EGMONT GROUP STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, supra note 164; FIu OVERVIEW, supra note
159, at 66.
171 FlU Overview, supra note 159, at 66-67.
172 If an FU comes across information that might be useful to another FU, the Egmont
Group recommends that the FU should consider supplying it spontaneously. FLU BEST
PRACTICES, supra note 167, at 3.
173 Some FUs use shared networks like the Egmont Secure Web or the European Union's
FlU-NET to transmit information. FU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 67.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 FlU BEST PRACTICES, supra note 167, at 3.
177 Id. at 4.
178 The Egmont Group advises that "[tihe providing FIU should not refuse its consent to
such dissemination unless this would fall beyond the scope of the AML/CFT provisions...
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1. A Paradigm Shift to Countering the Financing of Terrorism
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, anti-money-
laundering authorities have focused their efforts on detecting and deterring
money-laundering systems used to finance international terrorist activi-
ties. 180 The Financial Action Task Force altered the existing Forty Recom-
mendations by deleting specific references to drugs and expanding existing
Recommendations.' 8 1 The FATF also established the Nine Special Recom-
mendations on Terrorist Financing (Nine Special Recommendations). 18 2
Like the Forty Recommendations, the Nine Special Recommendations in-
clude a recommendation regarding international cooperation: "[e]ach coun-
try should afford another country... the greatest possible measure of assis-
tance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative
investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terror-
ism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations."'183 The Nine Special Recom-
mendations are to be read in conjunction with the Forty Recommendations
on money-laundering to provide a comprehensive AML/CFT framework.1
8 4
Additionally, at a special meeting held in October 2001, the Egmont Group
expanded its global network of information exchange to encompass terrorist
financing.'
85
These efforts were no doubt influenced by the UN Security Coun-
cil's unanimous adoption of Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001.186
Resolution 1373 called on all UN member states to prevent terrorist financ-
ing, 87 and created the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, which monitors
the implementation of counter-terrorism finance measures and requires
member states to exchange information about terrorist funding.!88 By invok-
or would otherwise not be in accordance with the fundamental principles of its national law."
Id. at2.
179 See id.
"0 FATF Standards, 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,2340,en_32250379_32236920_340320731_1 1
1,00.htm [hereinafter Nine Special Recommendations].
181 See Forty Recommendations, supra note 151.
182 Nine Special Recommendations, supra note 180.
183 Id.
194 See id.
18 International Legal Developments: Sub-Group 1: Critical Review of Terrorist Related
Legislation and the Monitoring of New Legislation, 6 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 201,
213 (2003).
186 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
187 Id. para. ](a).
181 See id. para. 6.
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ing Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1373 makes the ant-
terrorism effort legally binding.
1 89
2. Data Privacy Controls
According to the Egmont Group, the FIUs are "invited to do every-
thing possible to ensure that national legal standards and privacy laws are
not conceived so as to inhibit the exchange of information between or
among FlUs."'190 The Forty Recommendations, however, take a slightly
different stance on data privacy: "[c]ountries should ensure that financial
institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation of FATF Recommen-
dations."1 91 The FATF's message is clear: that the Forty Recommendations
and Nine Special Recommendations present the most effective AML/CFT
strategy and that countries should follow them closely.
3. Financial Information Exchange in the United States and European
Union
a. United States
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the U.S.
FlU. 9 2 It was created by order of the Secretary of Treasury on April 25,
1990 and is charged with administering the Bank Secrecy Act. 193 Section
361 of the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act), passed on October 25,
2001, established the organization as a bureau within the Department of
Treasury and clarified the duties and powers of FinCEN's Director. 194 Sec-
tion 314 of the PATRIOT Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
adopt regulations that encourage information sharing between regulatory
and law enforcement authorities and financial institutions regarding indi-
viduals, entities, and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected of
engaging in terrorist acts or money-laundering activities. 195
As in the process of information sharing between FIUs, U.S. law
enforcement agencies also follow a relatively straightforward process in
189 Id. at 1;U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
190 FIU BEST PRACTICES, supra note 167, at 1.
191 Forty Recommendations, supra note 151, at Recommendation Four.
192 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Intemational/Egmont Group/FlUs,
http://www.fincen.gov/int-fius.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
193 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, About FinCEN/FAQs, http://www.fmcen.gov/
af faqs.html#addressed (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
194 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-56,§ 361,
310, 115 Stat 272, 329-31.
19' Id. § 314(a).
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obtaining data from FinCEN. First, a federal law enforcement agency re-
quests information from FinCEN. 196 The agency must provide assurance
that the request has been scrutinized at the agency level and that it satisfies
FinCEN's standards for processing a Section 314(a) inquiry, and certify that
the investigation is based on credible evidence of terrorist financing or
money-laundering. 197 Next, FinCEN sends a request for information to a
designated contact within each financial institution.1 98 Then, the financial
institution queries its records for data matches.' 99 If an account or transac-
tion match, the law enforcement agency must then meet the applicable legal
standards to obtain the information. 200 If there is no match, then the finan-
cial institution does not reply to the request.
20
'
b. European Union
E.U. law requires each E.U. Member state to have its own FHU,
20 2
and most of these FIUs 20 3 utilize a web-based electronic system called
FIU.Net to share AML/CFT information with one another. 20 4 Directive
196 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet,
http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheet.pdf.
197 id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 id.
201 Id.
202 Without specifically requiring each member state to establish an FlU, Directive
91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money
laundering set forth numerous provisions requiring Member States to regulate their credit and
financial institutions closely in order to prevent money laundering. Council Directive
91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166), 77 (EU). Recognizing that all E.U. Member States had al-
ready established FlUs to abide by Directive 91/308/EEC, the Council, on October 17, 2000
adopted a Decision, which articulated a framework of cooperation and information exchange
between the Member State FlUs. Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, 2000 O.J. (L 271) 4 (EC).
Directive 2001/97/EC, which amended Directive 91/308/EEC, adopted measures that were
espoused by the FATF in the late 1990s, but similar to the 1991 Directive, it had no specific
reference to FlUs. Council Directive 2001/97/EC, 2001 O.J. L 344, 76 (EU). Finally, on
October 26, 2005, the European Parliament and Council ratified Directive 2005/60/EC on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terror-
ist financing. Council Directive 2005/60/EC, 2005 (L 309) 15, 27 (EC) (providing that
"[e]ach Member State shall establish a FU in order to effectively combat money laundering
and terrorist financing.").
203 Austria, Ireland, and Malta are only observers; Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Portugal, and Sweden will be connected in the near future. See FU.Net, FlU.Net Connec-
tions, http://www.fiu.net/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=48&Itemid=64
(last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
204 See FU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 68 ("FU.NET runs over a private network and is
highly secure, protected by firewalls as well as sophisticated encryption and authentication
technologies.").
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2005/60/EC (Third Directive)-the third of three Directives governing how
Member States regulate their financial and credit institutions 20 -expanded
the scope of two previous Directives to specifically reference terrorist fi-
nancing and to account for the June 2003 revisions in the Forty Recommen-
dations.2 °6 It is important to note that Third Directive prohibits financial
institutions from disclosing to their customers and other third persons that
the customer's information has been sent to the FIU or that their records are
under review.2 °7 This demonstrates that the European Union is willing to put
criminal investigation ahead of its strict adherence to data protection when
the processes that will ensure adequate data protection are followed.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The United States Should Terminate the TFTP and Instead Contin-
ue to Use FinCEN to Achieve Its AML/CFT Goals
The international community has almost universally accepted and
implemented the practice of international information sharing by FIUs.208 It
has been able to do this within the constructs of the Data Protection Direc-
tive, while at the same time achieving AML/CFT successes. 20 9 In accessing
the SWIFT network without first gaining an "adequacy finding" by the Eu-
ropean Commission and then a bilateral agreement with the European
Commission, the United States has circumvented all the data protection
filters that the FIU model is founded upon-mutual trust, home country
205 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
206 See Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges
Complying With Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAw 395 (2005).
207 Council Directive 2005/60/EC, art. 28, 2005 (L 309) 15, 28 (EC).
208 See discussion supra Part III.
209 According to FinCEN's former Director Robert W. Werner, FinCEN shared valuable
information with Spain's FU-Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of
Money Laundering and Monetary Infractions ("SEPLAC")-after the Madrid subway bomb-
ings and with the United Kingdom's FlU-Serious Organised Crime Agency ("SOCA")
following the United Kingdom's August 2006 discovery of a terrorist plot to blow up com-
mercial airliners flying from the United Kingdom to the United States. See Robert W. Wern-
er, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at the American Bankers Associa-
tion/American Bar Association Money Laundering Enforcement Conference, 10-12, (Oct. 9,
2006); THE EGMONT GROUP, FINANcIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE WORLD 4 (2007),
http:www.egmontgroup.org/list-of fius.pdf. The information shared with SOCA "arose from
U.S. financial institutions that proactively queried their records based on suspect lists re-
leased publicly by foreign authorities, found relevant information, and provided information
to FinCEN... [using] FinCEN's Financial Institutions Hotline." Robert W. Werner, Dir.,
Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at the American Bankers Association/American
Bar Association Money Laundering Enforcement Conference, 12, (Oct. 9, 2006),
http://www.fincen.gov/wemer10906.pdf.
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oversight, reciprocity, and confidentiality. 210 This naturally is unacceptable
to the European Union and other countries that have sophisticated data pro-
tection policies.2 ' Indeed, that is why on November 22, 2006, the Article 29
Working Party called for the immediate termination of the TFTP, claiming
that SWIFT had violated the Data Protection Directive. While the Represen-
tations represent a step in the right direction, they came nearly a year after
the initial disclosure of the TFTP by the New York Times.212 In addition, the
Representations are simply a series of unilateral, and for the most part, over-
ly broad commitments from the United States. It is unclear whether the ac-
knowledgement of such unilateral representations by representatives of the
Commission and Council is authorized under the Data Protection Directive
and the Safe Harbor Principles.
Even if the transfers are now legal under E.U. data protection law
through SWIFT's entry into the Safe Harbor, they still raise several other
concerns. First, SWIFT and the United States claim that the searches were
limited and targeted;213 however, some privacy watchdog organizations and
European Union officials doubt the limited nature of the program.214 If the
searches were not targeted, given the sheer magnitude of data that SWIFT
215manages, it is highly doubtful that the United States is able to get any-
thing from the data other than matching transactions and accounts with
210 See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
211 See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.c.
212 Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2, at Al.
213 See, e.g., SWIFT, Update and Q&A to SWIFT's 23 June 2006 Statement on Com-
pliance, August 25, 2006, http://www.swift.com/index.cfin?item id=60275 ("The United
States Department of Treasury (UST) subpoenas to SWIFT are only for a limited set of data
and for the exclusive purpose of terrorism investigations and for no other purpose.... The
UST... [is] only allowed to see data that is responsive to targeted searches in the context of
a specific terrorism investigation. Data searches must be based only on persons, entities or
related information with an identified connection to ongoing terrorism investigation .. ");
Press Release, Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intel-
ligence, Statement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, (June 23, 2006),
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/j s4334.htm.
214 Privacy International estimates that roughly one-percent (or 4.6 million) of the 460
million financial transactions originating in the United Kingdom and subsequently sent
through the SWIFT network in 2004 were secretly transferred to the United States under the
TFTP. Press Release, Privacy International, PI Estimates over 4 Million UK Financial
Records Sent Each Year to the U.S. (July 6, 2006), http://pi.gn.apc.org/article.shtml?cmd[3
47]=x-347-539301. According to the International Herald Tribune, Belgium Prime Minister,
Guy Verhofstadt, said that SWIFT had received administrative subpoenas for millions of
records. Dan Bilefsky, Belgian Leader Orders Bank Inquiry, INT'L HERALD Tam., June 26,
2006, at 3.
215 As mentioned earlier, SWIFT provides messaging services for roughly 8,100 financial
institutions in 207 countries and territories. See Schrank, supra note 94. This means that the
network carries up to 12.7 million messages per day. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 106.
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people on terror-watch lists. FinCEN could theoretically achieve the same
ends by providing these terror-watch lists to foreign FUs.
Although the U.S. authorities may be able to extract valuable in-
formation from the SWIFT data, the authorities are skipping a valuable
step-communication with foreign AML/CFT authorities. This step is im-
portant for two main reasons. First, the communication helps further global
AML/CFT efforts because by making a request to another FIU, the request-
ing FIU is sharing information on individuals suspected of being involved in
terrorist or money-laundering activities. Second, and more importantly, the
communication helps ensure that foreign data protection controls are not
breached because the transferring FlU provides an oversight mechanism
that is very limited under the TFTP-home country oversight.
The Representations state that the TFTP has "multiple complemen-
tary layers of independent oversight," including the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment, SWIFT representatives, an independent auditing firm, and even the
U.S. Congress.21 6 The addition of an eminent European provides another
layer. All of these "layers," however, present significant problems, which
are absent in the FLU system of financial information exchange.
First, while the appointment of an eminent European represents a
step in the right direction, the Representations state that "[i]n particular, the
eminent person will monitor that processes for deletion of non-extracted
data have been carried out. ' 2 17 Therefore, the eminent person's role strange-
ly appears limited to overseeing the deletion of non-extracted data, not the
use, dissemination, and retention of extracted data.
Second, several of the "multiple complementary layers of indepen-
dent oversight"--including the U.S. Treasury Department and SWIFT-are
not independent. In fact, their activities are, or at least should be, the subject
of the oversight.
Third, TFTP's independent auditor, Booz Allen-a global consult-
ing firm with over 19,000 employees worldwide 2 18-may not be entirely
independent.21 9 In a memorandum to the Article 29 Working Party, howev-
er, Privacy International and the American Civil Liberties Union claim that
Booz Allen's oversight of the TFTP is not independent because Booz Allen:
(1) has substantial U.S. government contracts, (2) is involved in other exist-
ing controversial U.S. government surveillance programs, (3) has numerous
employees-including many high level executives-with connections to
216 Representations, supra note 133, at 21.
217 Id. at 25.
218 Booz Allen Hamilton, About Booz Allen, http://www.boozallen.com/about (last visited
Oct. 11,2007).
219 Memorandum by the Am. Civil Liberties Union and Privacy Int'l for the Article 29
Working Party of the European Comm'n 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2006), http:www.aclu.org/pdfs/
safefree/boozallen20060914.pdf.
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federal intelligence and military agencies, and (4) lobbies for increased in-
formation sharing.220 Regardless of whether these allegations are true, the
TFTP clearly does not provide the same level of oversight as the FIU me-
thod of information sharing because the home country only has a limited
role in the process.
If the internationally-accepted FU model does not meet the needs
of the United States in its AML/CFT efforts, then the United States should
seek changes within the current system, not create an entirely new and se-
cret system. The United States has already made promising inroads in
achieving this objective. On January 17, 2007, the Department of Trea-
sury 2 2 1 delivered a report to Congress on the feasibility of a cross-border
electronic funds transfer system, which concluded that "the reporting of
cross-border wire transfer data by financial institutions is technically feasi-
ble for the government and may be valuable to the government's efforts to
combat money-laundering and terrorist financing., 222 The report calls for an
incremental process for the system's development, including spending the
remainder of 2007 "conduct[ing] a cost-benefit analysis with the participa-
tion of both the financial services industry and law enforcement, to deter-
mine and quantify both the benefits to the public of such a system and the
cost to all parties affected by any such potential regulatory requirement.,
223
FinCEN projects that the implementation of such a system would require
three and one-half years of labor and $32 million in investment over that
time period.224
220 See Memorandum by the Am. Civil Liberties Union and Privacy Int'l for the Article 29
Working Party of the European Comm'n 1-5 (Sept. 14, 2006), http:www.aclu.org/pdfs/
safefree/boozallen20060914.pdf.
221 Section 6302 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires
the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe regulations requiring such financial institutions as
the Secretary determines to be appropriate to report . . . certain cross-border electronic
transmittals of funds. If the Secretary determines that reporting of such transmittals is rea-
sonably necessary to conduct the efforts of the Secretary against money laundering and ter-
rorist financing." Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 31 U.S.C. §
5318(n) (Supp. IV 2000). Before prescribing the regulations, the Secretary of Treasury has to
submit a report to Congress that identifies the information that will be reported, how it will
be reported, what technology is necessary for FinCEN to manage the data, and the steps that
will be taken to protect the data. See id.
222 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN
Report to Congress States that the Reporting of Cross-Border Wire Transfer Data is Techni-
cally Feasible for the Government but Requires Further Collaboration (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.fincen.gov/newsrelease_cross-border.pdf.
223 Id.
224 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FEASIBILITY OF A
CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK
SECRECY ACT 21-22 (2006), http://www.fincen.gov/crossborder/CBFTFSComplete.pdf
[hereinafter FEASIBILITY OF FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM].
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While a U.S. cross-border electronic funds reporting system will
undoubtedly improve the U.S. AML/CFT capabilities, it will track the
cross-border financial transactions only of U.S. banking and financial insti-
tutions. Thus, it cannot act as a replacement for the TFTP because TFTP
monitors all of the international transactions stored by SWIFT. The United
States, however, can encourage and support other FlUs in developing simi-
lar cross-border electronic reporting systems.225 In promoting a global net-
work of FlUs that monitor and store cross-border financial transactions, the
United States can achieve its AML/CFT goals without circumventing the
current system of financial information exchange and without further strain-
ing diplomatic relations, especially with the Member States of the European
Union.
B. The United States Should Follow the Existing System of Financial
Information Exchange for PNR Data Transfers
Likewise, the United States' efforts to protect its borders from ter-
rorists could be substantially benefited by the adoption of a network of
global travel information modeled after the FLU network of financial infor-
mation exchange. Besides improving the terrorist-tracking capabilities, such
a system would appease the E.U. data protection authorities because the
E.U. Member States would have full oversight and control over the data. A
system modeled after the FIU network of financial information exchange
also constitutes the multilateral approach that the European Union has been
advocating since before the passage of the Original Agreement.226
Although the Revised Agreement does address some of the con-
cerns of the E.U. data protection authorities, it does not go far enough to
ensure that PNR information transfer abides by the Data Protection Direc-
tive. For example, while the Revised Agreement appears to solve the push-
pull problem,227 a system modeled after the current FlU network would pro-
vide even more data protection. That is, because of pre-existing fears that
the United States will discontinue airline service for the E.U. airline compa-
nies operating in and through the United States, the E.U. airline companies
225 FinCEN, through its Office of Global Liason, already advises developing FlUs on all
relevant AML/CFT efforts. FEASIBILITY OF FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM, supra note
224, at 42. In addition, Australia's FlU, the Australian Transaction Report & Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC), and Canada's FlU, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of
Canada (FINTRAC), already require their domestic financial institutions to report cross-
border wire transfers to their respective FlU. Werner supra note 209, at 11. In fact, both
AUSTRAC and FINTRAC have aided FinCEN in developing its own cross-border reporting
system by providing FinCEN with demonstrations of their respective systems and recom-
mendations on how to design and implement such a system. Id.
226 See Communication, supra note 50, at 9.
227 See supra Part II.A.5.
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may feel pressure to abide by all requests, even those that do not fully abide
by the provisions set forth in the Revised Agreement. Additionally, U.S.
Customs has already had full access to the E.U. airline companies' databas-
es through the Original Agreement. This history of open access helps to
create a somewhat normative standard of full disclosure.
1. The Proposed Model
A global traveler information network modeled after the FIU net-
work of financial information exchange and guided by the principles of the
FATF's Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations could
be relatively simple in both design and practice. Each country would enact
legislation establishing a travel intelligence unit (TIU) as an autonomous
agency or ministry. The TIU would collect limited sets of information 228 on
airline passengers 229 traveling within and outside of its borders. The infor-
mation would then be stored in a secure database for a limited duration-
possibly less than the current three and one-half year timeframe. In order to
obtain information on suspected international criminals,230 domestic law
enforcement officials would have to follow a similar process of obtaining
information from the TIU that they have to follow in order to obtain infor-
mation from their country's FLU.23 ' TIU-to-TIU information exchanges
would be guided by memorandums of understanding, similar to those in
place for the existing FIU-to-FU exchange. Just as an FIU's ability to share
information (which would otherwise most likely be protected under its
country's data privacy laws) with other FiUs is determined by law or sta-
232 towudteotute, so to would the TIU's ability to share information internationally be
determined by statute.
The TIU method of PNR data exchange is quite similar to the cur-
rent transfers of PNR data from the European Union to the United States,
but with two major changes. First, the requesting country's TIU has to deal
with another TIU, not with an airline carrier. This government-to-
government exchange, as opposed to the commercial entity-to-government
exchange, significantly increases the oversight of the transaction. The same
government that is responsible for upholding the privacy protections of its
228 The efficacy of the TJU method of PNR data exchange depends on its ability to serve as
a investigatory tool for law enforcement authorities from across the globe.
229 Passenger data could also be collected using other forms of international mass-transit
where advance ticketing systems are utilized, including commercial train, boat, and bus
travel.
230 In this context, suspected international criminals means persons allegedly involved in
serious international crimes, including but not limited to terrorist-related activities, money-
laundering, drug trafficking, war crimes, etc.
231 See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
232 FLU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 66.
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citizens would also be accountable in sharing PNRs with other govern-
ments. Second, this arrangement puts the onus on the country requesting the
data, as opposed to the current system where the burden lies on the com-
mercial airline carriers.
To further increase cooperation and oversight, the intelligence ac-
tivities of the T1Us could be supported and periodically monitored by a cen-
tral international organization like the Financial Action Task Force. As rec-
ognized by the European Commission, the transfer of PNR data is truly an
international problem.233 The Commission posited that the best solution
would be multilateral with the International Civil Aviation Organization
234
representing the best forum to bring forth such a multilateral initiative.235
The International Air Transport Administration (IATA), 236 on the
other hand, categorically opposes "[a]ny movement toward inter-
governmental regulation of PNR construction, whether through introduction
of Standards by ICAO ... or through the imposition of any State's national
legislation. 237 The IATA argues that "any movement to impose changes on
the industry with respect to the way that PNR's are constructed stored or
exchanged would require a massive restructure of the entire industry's un-
derlying [information technology] base., 238 Instead, the IATA has advo-
cated Advanced Passenger Information systems, in which passenger data is
transmitted to the border control authorities of the receiving country allow-
ing the border control authorities to perform watch-list checks. 239 After the
checks are run, the authority would then send a message back to the airline
carrier confirming or denying boarding privileges.24 ° While Advanced Pas-
senger Information may serve as an effective one-time security screening
process, it does not afford law enforcement authorities with the tracking and
investigatory tools that PNR systems provide. Furthermore, the IATA's
analysis assumes that the standard would be the current system of PNR
233 Communication, supra note 50, at 9.
234 See id. and accompanying text.
235 See Communication, supra note 50, at 10.
236 The International Air Transportation Administration (IATA) is a global trade organiza-
tion with approximately 240 airline-members, which comprise roughly ninety-four percent of
the international scheduled air traffic. IATA, About Us, http://www.iata.org/about/ (last
visited Oct. 28, 2007). Its mission is to represent, lead, and serve the airline industry. Id.
237 ICAO, Airline Reservation System and Passenger Name Record (PNR) Access by
States, ICAO Doc. FAL/12-WP/74 para. 5.4 (2004) [hereinafter IATA Presentation to
ICAO], available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal/fal12/documentation/fal 12wp074_
en.pdf.
238 Id. at para. 3.4.
239 INT'L AIR TRANsP. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2006), http://www.iata.org/iata/Sites/
agm/file/2006/file/annualreport_06.pdf.
240 id.
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transfers, not the multilateral framework that this Note recommends. In fact,
the IATA later concedes that a system where the airline carriers extract raw
PNR data from their systems and transmit it to a secure intermediate body to
be cleaned-a system similar to the one proposed in this Note-"has gained
a certain level of support amongst governments and airlines.
'241
Although a multilateral approach represents the best solution to this
date transfer problem, the International Civil Aviation Organization may not
represent the best medium for managing a multilateral initiative. The ICAO
is a UN Specialized Agency, and as with any UN agency, it is subject to the
bureaucratic constraints of the UN. Both the FATF and the Egmont Group,
on the other hand, are independent of UN bureaucracy and function as inde-
pendent groups with specific, specialized goals and objectives. 42 In addi-
tion, the independent-agency framework allows each country to further its
own specific criminal policy considerations while at the same time receiv-
ing centralized guidance from one or more specialized organizations.
2. Implementation of the Model
Before drafting Transportation Intelligence Unit legislation, the
United States and other developed nations should conduct a series of con-
sultations with the private sector and the International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization. 43 These consultations will aid in drafting legislation that will be the
least burdensome on the private sector and most efficient in carrying out the
goals of PNR exchange.2" In addition, the consultations will help to build
confidence in the TIU concept and in each country's own TIU on the part of
the institutions that will be charged with submitting the PNR data to the
Tm245TIU. 24
Next, each country will need to determine how the TIU will be fi-
nanced.246 This undoubtedly will be one of the greatest, if not, the greatest
challenge to implementing a global travel intelligence network. The Interna-
tional Air Transport Administration claims that since the collection of PNR
data by a government agency is an intelligence gathering operation, the as-
sociated costs "should be borne solely by the government(s) requesting...
data., 247 Although the IATA's premise is generally correct, it fails to take
into account the reciprocal benefits that the airline carriers will receive from
241 IATA Presentation to ICAO, supra note 237, para. 4.5.
242 See discussion supra part III.
243 See FLU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 7.
244 Cf id. (discussing countries' consultations with the private sector prior to setting up
FUs).
245 See id
246 See id. at 8.
247 IATA Presentation to ICAO, supra note 237, para. 4.4.
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a system that will give airline passengers more confidence in air travel secu-
rity. With that being said, the contributions of the airline carriers should be
small and in proportion to their presence within that country's air travel
market. Thus, the brunt of the financing will need to be borne by each re-
spective government. To help reduce operational costs, the TIU could be
located within another ministry or government agency.248 In addition, the
TIU could borrow technology, procedures, and expertise from its country's
FlU to keep costs at a minimum.
Finally, the implementation of such a network of travel intelligence
information also would be subject to country-specific restraints and re-
quirements. For instance, in the United States, as mandated by the E-
Government Act of 2002,249 the Department of Homeland Security would
have to conduct a "privacy impact assessment" prior to developing such a
system.25° A privacy impact assessment is defined as:
[a]n analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling con-
forms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding
privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining,
and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic infor-
mation system, and (iii) to examine and evaluate protections and alterna-
tive processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy
risks.251
3. Anticipated Objections and Problems with the Proposed Model
There are several possible objections to the cross-border travel in-
telligence system described above. The first possible challenge is that the
European Union is not concerned with terrorists flying from the United
States into Europe, and thus, the principle of reciprocity, which is vital to
the effective operation of FIUs, would be lacking entirely. There are three
responses to this objection: (1) as evidenced by the Revised Agreement, the
European Union is considering implementing a PNR transfer system similar
to that of the United States; 252 (2) once the system becomes more globa-
lized, countries like the European Union will be able to receive PNR data
from countries with a higher concentration of suspected terrorists; and (3)
the data collected by the TIUs could be used to track other persons who are
248 See FIU OVERVIEW, supra note 159, at 8.
249 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 § 208, 116 Stat, 2899, 2921-22 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
250 Id.
251 Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Sept. 26, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
memoranda/m03-22.html.
252 See Revised Agreement, supra note 71, at 24.
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suspected of committing serious international crimes.253 In fact, in the De-
cember 12, 2003 Communication to the European Council and Parliament,
the Commission stated that "any possible information exchange with the US
authorities should be based on a system of reciprocity in the transfer of data
between the EU and the US, whilst at the same time considering the possi-
bility for the collection and controlled transfer of PNR-data through a cen-
tral European entity.
'
,
254
Second, a comprehensive cross-border travel intelligence system
would actually represent a greater invasion of privacy than the current ar-
rangement between the United States and the European Union because all
passengers flying internationally would have their information collected by
their country's TIU. As noted by the International Air Transport Adminis-
tration, despite the fact that "only the United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand have legislation in place that makes government access to
airline reservation data mandatory[,] [a] number of other [countries] are
exploring this process as an additional component of their border security
strategy, and it is likely that more such requirements will be imposed in the
[future].",255 As more countries consider introducing PNR legislation, the
need for a multilateral solution only grows stronger. Additionally, an inter-
national travel intelligence system may have important applications outside
of fighting international crime. For instance, it could be invaluable in track-
ing and quarantining passengers exposed to infectious disease outbreaks.
Third, much of the effectiveness of the FIUs' ability to combat ter-
rorist financing and money-laundering operation comes from the activities
of the individual financial institutions, including their reporting of suspi-
cious activities. Because airlines deal with passengers on more of a single-
transaction basis, they would have less background information and would
have to make decisions on a particular passenger given his or her appear-
ance, demeanor, or behavior. Obviously, this is not an optimal result given
the room for racial and ethnic profiling and harassment. Therefore, instead
of selectively reporting suspicious transactions, the airline would simply
have to report all transactions involving international travel to its respective
TIU. This removes any possibility of profiling by the airline carriers. In
addition, airline carriers, airport security, and the Federal Aviation Authori-
ties would all have to report other major security-related instances to its
TIU-for instance, when a passenger is detained for security reasons before,
during, or after his or her flight.
253 In order to prevent governments from abusing the PNR data, the TIU's disclosure to law
enforcement officials should be limited to serious international crimes, including but not
limited to: drug trafficking, money laundering, and espionage.
254 Communication, supra note 50, at 9.
255 IATA Presentation to ICAO, supra note 237, para. 1.3.
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A final potential objection to a comprehensive cross-border travel
intelligence system is that it, would be an enormous undertaking, too com-
plex for many undeveloped and developing nations. While such an under-
taking would be a substantial enterprise for undeveloped and developing
nations, the G-7, led strongly by the United States, could pilot such a pro-
gram at first and then provide financial incentives for developing nations to
implement their own TIUs. To address the problems that the small develop-
ing island economies, such as those in parts of the Caribbean and the South
Pacific, are having in establishing their own FJUs,256 the International Mon-
etary Fund and the Egmont Group envisage establishing "an organization to
support national FlUs in the subregion, rather than a regional FLU" because
according to the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force, FLUs
are national entities.257 Similar sub-regional organizations could be estab-
lished to support the developing nations in initiating their own TIUs.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to effectively combat terrorist-related activities and other
serious international crimes, law enforcement authorities must identify ter-
rorists and other international criminals during the only two instances in
which they reveal themselves to the international community-when they
travel abroad and when they transact abroad. Recognizing this notion nearly
two decades ago, the United States and other global powers began sharing
information pertaining to financial transactions for the purpose of combat-
258ing money-laundering and its support of the international drug trade.
Then, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, both governments
started using this financial information sharing network to combat terrorism.
During the same period, the United States began secretly subpoenaing fi-
nancial records from SWIFT under TFTP. It also passed legislation that
required air carriers "operating a passenger flight in foreign air transporta-
tion to the United States [to] provide the Commissioner of Customs [with
PNR data], 2 9 and that would eventually require the United States and the
European Union to agree on how the E.U. airlines would provide that PNR
data.
256 In general, the developing economies experience four main problems in establishing an
FlU: (1) finding staff sufficiently knowledgeable in financial investigations, forensic ac-
counting, and other AML/CFT tasks; (2) achieving the same economies of scale as the larger
FlUs, which deal primarily with formal banking and fund-transfer networks; (3) establishing
a relationship of reciprocity and trust with other established FlUs; and (4) finding adequate
financial commitments. See FlU OvERviEw, supra note 159, at 30-31.
257 Id. at 31.
258 STESSENS, supra note 141, at 15-17.
219 49 U.S.C 44909(c) (Supp. IV 2000).
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While the PNR data transfers and the TFTP maintain the appropri-
ate focus of identifying suspected terrorists when they reveal themselves to
the international community, they do not provide adequate privacy protec-
tion for citizens of foreign countries. Therefore, a careful balance must be
struck between tracking down suspected international criminals-including
terrorists-and the protection of privacy rights. In order to strike this deli-
cate balance, (1) the United States should terminate the TFTP immediately
and improve the existing system of financial information exchange to satis-
fy its AML/CFT needs, and (2) the United States and the European Union
should work to develop an international system of travel information ex-
change based on the existing model of financial information exchange.

